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August 6, 1943 


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THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE 



Offic-e of Strategic Services 
Branch of Research and Analysis 
Europe-Africa Division 
Psychological Warfare Subdivision 
Central European Section 


Copy No. 


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I. Summary 


TABLE OP CONTENTS 


II. The Content of the Manifesto 


1. The Restoration of Civil Rights 

2. The Appeals of the Manifesto 

a) The appeal to democracy 

b) The revolutionary implications 

c) The nationalistic appeal 

3. The German Social Groups. 

4. The Appeal to the Western Powers. 


III. The National Bolshevist Tradition 

1. National Bolshevism in the Communist Party 

a) The conclusion of the Versailles Treaty 

b) Inflation and Ruhr Occupation 

c) 1930 and the Growth of Nazism 

d) The Doctrine of the People 1 s Revolution 

e) The Extermination of German National Bolshevics 

by the GPU 

f) Consequences 

2. National Bolshevic Trends in the Nazi Movement 

a) Hitler: Opposition to National Bolshevism 

b) Goebbels, Gregor Strasser, and Ley 

c) The Pinal Blow against National Bolshevism 

d) Otto Strasser's Black Front 

IV. Attitudes Toward Russia 


1. Trends in Germany's Foreign Policy 

2. The Western Orientation - F. List, General Hoffmann, 

Hitler, Rosenberg 

3. The Eastern Orientation - Seeckt, Brockdorff-Rantzau, 

V. Maltzahn, Kuehlmann, The Geopoliticians 

4. The Bridge Theory - Stresemann, Koch-Weser, the Social 

Democrats. 


V. The Strength of Communism and of the Anti-Nazi Groups 

1. Party Strength in 1932, 1933 

2. Strength of the CP 

3. Strength of Social Democratic Party 

4. The CP Underground 

5. The Fear of Communism 

6. The Strength of Socialism 

7. The Ruling Classes and Soviet Russia 


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1 


I. SUMMARY 


(1) This memorandum deals exclusively with the reception that 
the Free German Manifesto is likely to have in Germany. It does 
not deal with Russian-German relations and the aspirations of 
Russia in Central Europe. Nor has an attempt been made to study 
the reception of the Manifesto outside of Germany and among Ger¬ 
man refugee groups. 

(2) The Manifesto derives its strength from the fact that it 
offers the German people the prospect of national survival and 
independence after the termination of the war and the destruction 
of the Nazi regime. It does so by entrusting the German people 
itself with the task of overthrowing the Nazi regime * and estab¬ 
lishing a democratic government. 

(3) The Manifesto combines the democratic appeal with the desire 
for national self-preservation and independence, thus directing 
itself to all the potential anti-Nazi forces in Germany. 

(4) While this broad "united front" is not capable of providing 
a basis for a future Popular Front government in Germany, it may 
well constitute an effective force for the overthrow of the Nazi 
regime. 

(5) The democratic conception of the Manifesto contains enough 
revolutionary implications to re-activate the old left-wing anti- 
Nazi opposition among the German workers, especially the remnants 
of the CP. 

(6) The appeal to the longing for national survival and independ¬ 
ence has, in conjunction with the genuine anti-Nazi opposition, 
no nationalistic or imperialistic implications. 

(7) The failure, however, to reach an understanding between the 
Western Powers and Russia on post-war policy may swing the Free 
Germany movement into an alliance with those circles of the Army 
Command and the so-called "left-wing" Nazi leadership which pre¬ 
fer collaboration with Russia to British-American occupation. In 
this case, the Free Germany movement would revitalize "National- 
Bolshevik" sentiments. 

(8) Such sentiments were strong in the German CP in 1919 3 1923 
and from 1930-1932. Though the leaders of this line have been 
killed in Russia, a full-blown National Bolshevism may be used 
any time to entice the nationalistic youth and the army to join 
forces with the CP. 

(9) National Bolshevik trends within the Nazi Party are not rep¬ 
resented in the present leadership with the possible exception of 


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Erich Koch. The National Bolshevik ideology, however, still 
has undoubtedly a strong attraction with the youth and the 
intellectuals. 

(10) Between 1919 and 1933 three trends were operating in German 
foreign policy.: the Western orientation (General Max Hoffmann, 
Hitler, Rosenberg), the Eastern orientation (General Von Seeckt, 
V. Brockdorff-Rantzau, V. Maltzahn), and the bridge theory 
(Stresemann, Koch-We.ser,.. the Social Democrats). The victory of 
the bridge theory was short-lived and bound up with a more or 
less stable political and social system. High officers and many 
of the conservatives favored, and may still favor. Eastern ori¬ 
entation. 

(11) The most influential trend among the German underground 
movement is apparently towards a democratic socialism that is 
entirely independent of the Russian system. Only the f$ar of 
the dismemberment and enslavement of the Reich could drive the 
German masses into the Bolshevik camp. 


(72852) 



The Manifesto by the National Committee of Free Germany 1/ 
is, if considered divorced from its political surroundings, a 
document of no prime political significance. Statements on Post- 
War Germany have been issued by many refugee groups, all of them 
unimportant. Three facts make this manifesto significant: 

1. the backing it apparently received from Soviet Russia 2/; 

2. the revolutionary implication of the manifesto; 

3• its appeal to the desire for national self-preservation. 


II. THE CONTENT OF THE MANIFESTO 


1. The content of the Manifesto is at first sight not much dif¬ 
ferent from that of the Weimar Constitution of 1919, in spite of 
the fact that the Manifesto declares that it "will have nothing 
in common with the helpless Weimar regime”. It desires a "strong" 
government, a "strong democratic power", the "annulment of all 
laws based on national and racial hatred ... of all measures of 
the Hitlerite authorities directed against freedom and human dig¬ 
nity, and the restoration of religious freedom." This means the 
reactivation of Articles 109 (equality before the law), 114, 115, 
117, 118 (freedom of the person, of the home, of communications, 
of opinion), and Article 135 (of religion). It demands the 
"restoration and extension of the political rights and social 
gains of the working people", formerly contained in Articles 159 
(freedom of trade union organizations), 165 (cooperation of labor 
organizations in the administration of the economy), l6l (mainte¬ 
nance of health and capability to work). The Manifesto promises 
the restoration of the freedom of economy, trade and handicraft; 
the guaranteed right to labor and to own lawfully acquired prop¬ 
erty -- almost direct quotations from Article 153 (freedom of 
property), 152 (freedom of trade and industry), 164 (protection 
of the independent middle classes), 157 (labor power stands under 
the special protection of the Reich). The Manifesto is thus al¬ 
most literally a summary of Part Two of the Weimar Constitution 
entitled "Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Germans", while 
the basic idea of Part One "Structure and Task of the Reich" is 
but scantily treated, since there is no mention of parliamentary 
organs. 


1/ Full, apparently authentic text in New York Times , August 1, 

1943. 

2/ The Pravda has accepted the manifesto, see Plain Moscow Aug. 2, 
1943. This backing may be temporary and may be withdrawn as 
has been pointed out in report, "The Soviet Union and Free 
Germany", submitted jointly by the U.S.S.R. Division, and Cen¬ 
tral European Section. This possibility will be discarded 
here. 

(72852) 








2. The Manifesto, however, may have today a much greater sig¬ 
nificance than the Weimar Constitution ever had in its time. 

a) The appeal to democratic memories and principles could 
by itself hardly have any effect in Germany. P/W interrogations 
show that only the politically conscious anti-Nazis criticize 
the regime on social and political grounds. The young genera¬ 
tion knows nothing about democracy 1/, and the older one is 
probably still reminiscent of the impotence and failure of the 
Weimar Republic. The importance of the Manifesto consists in 
the fact that it shows the democratic revolution as a way to 
terminate the war without losing national unity and independence . 
The Manifesto goes beyond the Unconditional Surrender by imply¬ 
ing the preservation of Germany*s national unity and sovereignty 
after the abolition of the Hitler system. In doing so, the 
Manifesto avoids the gravest mistake of our PW against Germany, 
namely, the failure to show the German people a way of termi-*. 
nating the war and overthrowing the Nazi regime without surren¬ 
dering its national independence to a foreign conqueror. The 
Manifesto makes an ingenious use of our failure by telling the 
Germans that, if■ they continue to submit to Hitler, they will 

be inevitably defeated by our growing military power: "Hitler 
then will be overthrown only by the force of the coalition 
armies. But this will signify the end of our national independ¬ 
ence and of our state existence, the dismemberment of our father¬ 
land." If, on the other hand, the German people does not wait 
until the Wehrmacht is beaten, if the German army keeps its arms 
and turns them against the Nazi regime, it will, in beating 
Hitler, at the same time beat the enemies: the United Nations 
would not invade a democratic Germany which has eradicated the 
Nazi system. The fight against Hitler is thus presented as a 
fight for Germany’s national self-preservation, as a war of so¬ 
cial and national liberation. 

b) The democratic appeal of the Manifesto is, however, not 
only tied up with the longing for national self-preservation, 
but also with the desire for far-reaching social changes. Every 
vestige of Marxism is carefully avoided, but the Manifesto has 
nevertheless definite revolutionary implications, which obtain 
additional weight through the Communist signers of the document. 
These implications are revealed in the sentences on the "con¬ 
fiscation of property of those responsible for the war and of 
the war profiteers," on the punishment of the instigators, ring¬ 
leaders, and accomplices "behind the scene," in the appeal" to 
the "working men and women on all fronts," in the exhortation to 
organize "fighting groups at the enterprises, in the villages, in 
the labor camps, in the. universities." They are furthermore in¬ 
dicated by the explicit .statement that the future German democra¬ 
cy "will have nothing in common with the helpless Weimar regime." 


1/ Gee especially Hitler 
B370 July 29, 19^3 


A Survey of P/W Opinion 


(Secret) 
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c) The Manifesto thus combines the national and the revo¬ 
lutionary appeal on a democratic basis, thereby utilizing the 
strongest interests and desires prevalent among the potential 
arr k^“Nazi opposition. In doing so, the Manifesto directs it¬ 
self to the following groups: 


3. 

a) the workers, especially the politically trained older 
workers who will have no difficulties in recognizing the revo¬ 
lutionary content in the nationalistic form, 

b) the small peasants, who have become increasingly resent¬ 
ful of the totalitarian regimentation of agriculture, 

c) those strata of the middle classes which have been pro- 
letarized in the process of total mobilization, 

d) a large part of the intelligentsia, 

e) the common soldiers, 

f) certain high army circles which are favoring an under¬ 
standing with Russia rather than with the Western Powers (in 
this group might be included the so-called "left wing" of the 
Nazi leadership and the SS). 

There can be no doubt that these groups cannot form the 
basis for a future democratic government in Germany. The di¬ 
verging interests of the workers, the middle classes, the offi¬ 
cer corps, and the "left-wing" Nazi leadership cannot be united 
after the breakdown of the Nazi system any more than under the 
Weimar Republic. Consequently, the Manifesto refrains from any 
too explicit revival of the Popular Front conception and limits 
the "united front" to the task of overthrowing the Nazi regime. 
With this limitation, however, the Manifesto and the policy sug¬ 
gested by it is bound to have a considerable effect on all the 
beforementioned groups, chiefly on account of its emphasis on 
national self-preservation. 

The appeal to national self-preservation is by no means 
an appeal to imperialistic or nationalistic tendencies. The 
protest against dismemberment of the old Reich (the Manifesto 
proclaims the renunciation of all conquests) and the insistence 
on national unity and sovereignty will be readily accepted even 
by the Socialist and Communist opposition. The Marxian tradi¬ 
tion is probably still alive among the older generation of German 
workers, and in this tradition, national independence is one of 
the preconditions of social progress. The German people — like 
all civilized people -- regard this right as an integral part of 
the right to shape its own destiny. The idea of national inde¬ 
pendence arose with the idea of democracy, and precisely the 
democratic forces have most strongly insisted on its realization. 


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- 6 - 


The United States and Great Britain have been considered in Ger¬ 
many as the model countries where democracy and national unity 
have been achieved. We can hardly blame the democratic forces 
in Germany for adhering to an ideal which we ourselves have-re¬ 
alized and promoted. If this ideal is taken over and implemented 
by the genuine anti-Nazi opposition, there is no danger of its 
being abused for imperialistic aggression. Imperialistic nation¬ 
alism is the characteristic of certain social groups whose in¬ 
terests are dependent on aggressive expansion (mainly the monop¬ 
olistic strata of German industry, the Junkers and militarists); 
it is not to them that the Manifesto appeals; it rather calls 
for their "punishment” as the war profiteers and instigators. 

4. There is one aspect of the Manifesto, however, which sounds 
a different appeal. It is directed not only to the German people 
but also to the British and American statesmen, challenging them 
to come out with a declaration of post-war policy toward Europe, 
If an understanding between the Western Powers and Russia cannot 
be reached, the "Free Germany" movement may become an instrument 
for power politics. The Manifesto contains a clear indication 
of that, in appealing to those army and party circles which may 
prefer a German-Russian coalition to British-American occupation. 
If the United Nations do not succeed in allying themselves with 
the genuinely anti-Nazi opposition in Germany, if they do not 
give the German people the chance of social as well as political 
reconstruction as a free democratic nation, then the Manifesto 
might easily become the first attempt to create a "National- 
Bolshevik" regime in Germany. For that it could revitalize a 
significant political trend on the Left as well as on the Right 
in Germany. 


III. THE NATIONAL BOLSHEVIST TRADITION 


National Bolshevism has two origins, one in the Communist 
Party, the other in the nationalistic organizations, especially 
the Free Corps. The first used nationalism as a means to seduce 
the nationalist youth into the communist camps, the second to 
draw communists into the nationalistic ranks. 

1. National Bolshevism in the Communist Party 

a) National Bolshevist trends became apparent at the time of 
£he discussion of the Versailles Treaty. On May 13, 1919, the’ 
Comintern issued a manifesto entitled "Down with the Versailles 
Treaty". 1/ The CP leadership, especially Paul Levi.and Karl 
Radek 2/ were compelled to attack the already existing trends 


1/ See Die Internationale , Vol, I, No. 11/12, pp. 244 seq. 

2/ Die Internationale , Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 3 seq. 

W (72852) 












towards National Bolshevism which became especially apparent 
in the Hamburg CP. 1/ Under Paul Levi’s influence the ultra- 
Left (the National Bolsheviks and Syndicalists) was compelled 
to leave the party as an aftermath to the second illegally held 
party conference of the CP. Under his influence participation 
in the elections was decided and direct revolutionary action as 
advocated by the Hamburg group was rejected. The ultra Left op¬ 
position under the leadership of Laufenberg and Wolfheim formed 
the KAPD (Communist Workers Party of Germany) and soon lost in¬ 
fluence completely. The eliminated radicals found, however, 
entrance into the CP when the party became what was then called 
a "revolutionary mass party." Though it is not our task to show 
the many changes through which the policy of the CP passed, a 
few incidents must be mentioned. 

b) The National Bolshevist trends became predominant in 
1923, a year characterized by two major events: the occupation 
of the Ruhr and the inflation. The slogan of the CP then was 
"Beat Poincare on the Ruhr and Cuno on the Spree". 2/ The fight 
of the CP was thus directed against French imperialism and the 
cabinet of Chancellor Cuno, who was undoubtedly a representative 
of German shipping and industrial interests. Actually, however, 
the CP directed its attack almost exclusively against France and 
supported the passive resistance of the German people. This was 
in line with Soviet Russia's foreign policy after the conclusion 
of the Rapallo treaty with Germany. Soviet Russia considered 
England and France as the protagonists of anti-Russian interven¬ 
tionism. The Comintern as well as the Central Executive Commit*- 
tee of the Russian CP thus protested against the Reich occupa¬ 
tion. 3/ It is during that time that within the Communist Party 
the idea arose that Germany was a suppressed country and that con¬ 
sequently the Communists must assume the leadership in the strug¬ 
gle for national liberation. The CP deputy Dengel stated while 
surveying the political situation in 1923 in the 11th Party Con¬ 
gress of 1927 that a just war of national liberation would have 
been possible in 1923. 4/ In the course of the inflation, po¬ 
litical and social antagonisms deepened in Germany. The petty 
bourgeois wavered, according to Communist conceptions, between 
Fascist and Communist sympathies. 5/ 


1/ See Arnold Struthahn, "Die Auswaertige Politik des deutschen 
Kommunismus und der Hamburger Nationale Bolschevismus” in Die 
Internationale, Vol. I, Nos. 17 and 18, pp. 340. 

2/ See Rakosi in Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschaft, Politik und Arbeiter- 
bewegung" 1923-24 (official publication of the CP), Hamburg, 
1924, pp. 17, and Thalheimer, pp. cit. p. 601. 

3/ See Russian Info rmation Review , Vol. 2, 1922-23, p. 244. 
tj Minutes of the Party Congress of 1927, P- 303. 

5/ Thalheimer in "jahrbuch fuer Wirtschaft, Politik und Arbeiter- 
bewegung," 1923-24, p. 598. 


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- 8 - 


The CP believed that the time of a new revolution had ar¬ 
rived, and from the summer of 1923 on it became the rallying 
point of all discontented masses. Thousands entered the Commu¬ 
nist Party. It is in these circumstances that the National 
Bolshevist theory and tactics were adopted. Rakosi praised 
it in 1923* 1/ Radek delivered a speech at the occasion of 
Schlageter’s execution by the French. It is worthwhile remem¬ 
bering that Schlageter is one of the Nazis 1 most celebrated na¬ 
tional heroes. Radek said: "The history of this martyr of Ger¬ 
man nationalism shall not be clothed in silence nor shall it be 
settled with a slighting phrase . . . Schlageter, the courageous 
soldier of the counter-revolution, deserves honor in a manly 
and honorable fashion by us soldiers of the revolution.... Only 
an alliance with the German working classes can liberate Ger¬ 
many from the yoke of imperialism/' 2/ 


Radek*s speech became the starting point for the National 
Bolshevist campaign. Count Reventlow was invited to write in 
the Rote Fahne . Lower CP officials went so far as to publish 
posters adorned with the Soviet star and the swastika and in¬ 
vited Nazis to speak in Communist meetings. Ruth Fischer, then 
a member of the Executive Committee of the CP, addressed the na¬ 
tionalist students in Berlin in the following way: "The German 
Reich . . . can be saved only if you, gentlemen of the German 
racial groups, recognize that you must fight jointly with the 
masses organized in the CP". She continued, "Whoever attacks 
Jewish capital ... is already a class fighter even if he 
doesn*t know it.... Crush the Jewish capitalists, hang them 
on the laippposts, trample them". She ended by saying, "French 
imperialism is now the greatest danger in the world. France is 
a country, of reaction. The German people can drive French capi¬ 
tal from' the Ruhr only in an alliance with Russia." 3/ The- cam¬ 
paign had no success and the National Bolshevist line was dropped. 
It did not become a predominant feature of Communist policy until 
the very end of the Weimar Republic. 


c) The elections of 1930 showed the growth of National So¬ 
cialism, and the Communist Party desperately sought for a new 
political line which would allow them to counteract the growing 
influence of the National Socialist Party on the masses. The 
leadership went to Heinz Neumann, the most irresponsible Commu¬ 
nist leader. Neumann directed the attack of the Communist Party 
almost exclusively against the Social Democrats who were labeled 
as "Social Fascists. Slogans like "Drive the Social Fascists 


1/ "Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschaft, Politik und Arbeiterbewegung", 
1923 - 24 , p. 26 . 

2/ Quoted by Georg Schwarz, Voelker, Hoeret, die Zentrale . KPD 
Bankrott, Berlin, 1933, p. 91• 

3/ See Schwarz, o£. cit ., p. 92. 


■mmm 


(72852) 











from their.positions in the plants and factories", "Beat the 
Social Fascists" were formulated. Thaelmanri himself said 
Without being victorious in the fight against the social de¬ 
mocracies, we shall not be able to beat Fascism". 1/ The Exec¬ 
utive Committee of the CP adopted as late as September 1932 an 
&nti-social democratic resolution. 2/ 

At the same time the National Bolshevist line was rejuve¬ 
nated under the auspices of Heinz Neumann. He addressed a 
Gcebbels meeting in Berlin in the following, way: "Young So¬ 
cialists! Brave fighters for the nation! The Communists do 
not desire fraternal strife with the National Socialists." 3/ 

This time the Communists were successful to some extent. 
Lieutenant Scheringer, whom the Supreme Court had sentenced to 
imprisonment for National Socialist activities within the army, 
was converted to Communism primarily under the influence of his 
fellow prisoner, the Communist Captain, Ludwig Renn. 4/ A number 
of other officers, especially of the Free Corps Bund Oberland, 
also joined the CP. 

The election manifesto of the Communist Party published on 
August 24, 1930 begins with the following words: "We shall tear 
up- the thievish Versailles "Peace Treaty" and the Young Plan 
which enslaved Germany. We shall annul all international debts 
and reparation payments". The manifesto ends with the words, 
"Down with the Young Plan! Down with the government of the capi¬ 
talists and Junkers! Down with Fascism and social democracy! 

Long live the dictatorship of the Proletariat! Long live Soviet 
Germany!" The manifesto insists on the socialization of heavy 
industry, banks, large estates and big traders and officers, and 
on a union of all toiling masses on the basis of the broadest pos¬ 
sible soviet democracy. 

In his speech before the Executive Committee of the CP, 

April and May 1931* the then Party leader Thaelmann declared that 
the whole tradition of the CP was permeated by its fight against 
Versailles. He reminded the listeners of the policy of the 
Spartakus union and of the Ruhr struggle of 1923 and he did not 
concede a contradiction between the struggle for national libera¬ 
tion and proletarian internationalism. 5/ 


1/ Die Internationale , Vol. 14, p. 492. 

2/ Resolution of the Twelfth Ekki Plenum in Die Internationale , 
Vol. 15, p. 384. 

3/ Schwarz , op. cit., p. 206. 

5/ He is now one of the main members of the Free Germany move¬ 
ment in Mexico. He is an outstanding novelist and writer on 
military affairs. Renn is a pen name. He belongs to the 
German nobility. 

5/ See Peter Maslowski, Thaelmann , Leipzig, 1932, p. 77. 


(72852) 











10 


In February 1932 at the meeting of the Central Committee 
Thaelmann reiterated the position of the Communist Party in 
the following manner: "We abe the sole party in Germany which 
really and with the greatest determination fights against the 
policy of fulfillment.... National liberation cannot be di¬ 
vorced from the social liberation of the toiling people, that 
is from the overthrow of capitalism.... One cannot fight against 
the Versailles system if one engages in violent baiting of the 
only government in the world which did not sign the shameful 
Versailles Treaty.... The Hitler party will become the direct 
ally of Pilsudski's Poland which with her policy of the Polish 
Corridor and in Upper Silesia where she enslaves and tortures 
German workers and peasants.... One cannot fight against the 
Versailles Treaty and the Young slavery without unfurling the 
banner of proletariat internationalism.” 1/ 

d) This National Bolshevist approach was superseded by the 
doctrine of the "people's revolution" shortly before Hitler's 
access to power. This doctrine is outwardly incompatible with 
the old Bolshevist theory that revolutions are prepared by small 
groups of determined professional revolutionaries. The doctrine 
of the people's revolution, however, must be considered as a 
fore-runner of the Manifesto of the Free Germany Committee. 

This doctrine was proclaimed for the first time in 1931. "The 
Communist Party . . . must organize the people's revolution 
against Fascism and economic castigation -- that is its historic 
task." 2/ The program of the people's revolution, so another 
manifesto said, "will bring liberty to the toiling peasants." 3/ 

The crowning tactical step of the people's revolution doc¬ 
trine was the Referendum in the summer of 1931 for the dissolu¬ 
tion of the Prussian Diet with the aim of overthrowing the so¬ 
cial democratic government of Braun and Severing. Though the 
Communist Party originally opposed the initiative sponsored by 
Nazis, Nationalists, and the Steel Helmet, Heinz Neumann suc¬ 
ceeded in bringing the Communist Party behind the National op¬ 
position. Remmele, his second in command, 4/ supported Neumann. 
Thaelmann against his better insight was compelled to defend the 
Inglorious Referendum. 

Only in October 1932 did the Thaelmann group begin to at¬ 
tack the National Bolshevist line and the doctrine of the 
people's revolution. 5/ 


1/ Maslowski, ojd. cit ., p. 88 

2/ Die Internationale , Vol. 13, p. 584. 

3/ Maslowski, op. cit ., p. 79. 

5/ Remmele has been executed by the G.P.U. in Russia together 
with Heinz Neumann. 

5/ See Thaelmann In Die Internationale , Vol. 15, p. 386. 


( 72852 ) 







11 


e) The Russians have killed almost all the advocates of this 
National Bolshevik line -- Heinz Neumann, Remmele, Max Hoelz -- 
and have thus shown, from 1933 to 1941, to have definitely re¬ 
jected the National Bolshevik theory. Only in November 1932 was 
there a mass manifestation of Bolshevik and Nazi solidarity. The 
Berlin Transport Workers struck. The Social Democratic Trade Un¬ 
ion outlawed the strike but the National Socialist Workers Cell 
Organization (N.S.B.O.) together with the Red Trade Union Opposi¬ 
tion, 'carried the strike, supported it and succeeded in organ¬ 
izing sympathy of almost the whole Berlin population. 

f) It follows from the above that the Communist Party has 
frequently attempted to exploit the nationalist traditions and 
longings among huge groups of the German people especially among 
the army and the intellectuals. It was unsuccessful from 1919 

to 1933 becuase the Nationalists preferred to join the Nazi Party 
which, due to its predominantly nationalistic appeal, appeared 
to be a much more effective guardian of nationalistic aspirations. 
But the Nazi Party is in a state of disintegration and its power 
will d.ecline with the decline of Germany's military fortunes. It 
is not impossible that this collapse of the Nazi Party may enable 
the Communist Party to organize better than ever before the genu¬ 
ine nationalistic passion inherent in the German youth, the Ger¬ 
man intelligentsia and the professional soldiers and officers. 

2. National Bolshevik Trends in the Nazi Movement 

a) National Bolshevik trends are not represented in the 
present Nazi leadership. It can even be said without exaggera¬ 
tion that Hitler established his total control over the Party 
primarily by the ruthless elimination of those who adhered to 
this doctrine that appeared to him the greatest impediment to 
the seizure, maintenance, and strengthening of the Party's con¬ 
trol over the German Reich. It has elsewhere been pointed out 1/ 
that the turning point in the strategy of the Nazi Party was the 
fiasco of the Munich Putsch of 1923- The failure of this at¬ 
tempted overthrow of the established government by means of vio¬ 
lence taught Hitler a lesson which he never forgot, the lesson, 
namely, that the Nazi Party can come to power only with the as¬ 
sistance of the most powerful ruling groups invGermany through 
Parliamentary processes. The subsequent history of National 
Socialism has amply demonstrated his conviction that he can re¬ 
tain power only by letting the ruling groups share in the spoils 
of peaceful and warlike exploitation of the German masses as well 
as those of occupied Europe. This insight led Hitler to a ruth¬ 
less war against those who advocated some kind of a .National Bol¬ 
shevist program. 


1/ Franz Neumann, Behemoth : The Structure and Practice of 
National Socialism, New York, 1942, p. 4l and 42. 


(72852) 
















12 


b) It is commonly believed that Goebbels and Ley are the 
two spokesmen of the so-called radical wing in the Nazi Party, 
a wing that would not hesitate to resort to Socialist and even 
Bolshevist measures if the power of the Nazi Party could there¬ 
by be maintained. 

.It is quite true that when Goebbels started his career 
within the Nazi Party he joined forces with Gregor Strasser, 
the leader of the Political Organization of the Party. Jointly 
with Gregor Strasser, Goebbels created and edited a semi-monthly 
periodical ,f Nationalsozialistische Briefe" (National Socialist 
Letters), not designed for public consumption. The first issue 
appeared on October 1, 1925? and the slogan was the "Reconcil¬ 
iation of Socialism with the East." The program of this group 
was formulated by Goebbels in the middle of 1925’ in an article 
in the Voelkischer Beobachter 1/, where the following statement 
appeared "The future lies with the dictatorships of the So¬ 
cialist idea." The Strasser-Goebbels group attacked Rosenberg's 
anti-Russian and anti-Semitic conceptions. It demanded eastern 
orientation of the Nazi Party, opposition to American and English 
imperialism and assistance to Russia*s fight against this imperi¬ 
alism. Germany's place was on the side of Russia, Turkey, China, 
India, in short on the side of all those people which are hostile 
to Versailles. Russia therefore is the natural ally of Germany 
and it is nobody's concern how Russia is internally governed. 

These views were supported by Gregor Strasser's brother, 

Otto Strasser, and by Count Reventlow, who belonged to the 
Deutsch Voelkische Freiheitspartei which had formed an alliance 
with the Nazi Party in March 1923• 

c) The occasion for dealing the first blow to the National 
Bolshevist trend within the party was the Communist sponsored 
referendum for the expropriation of the princely houses. On 
February 14, 1925? Hitler called a meeting of the party leaders 
to Bamberg. The northern Gaue were represented only by Gregor 
Strasser and Goebbels. Hitler succeeded, in spite of Strasser's 
opposition to commit the party to wholesale opposition to the 
Communist initiative by depicting it as Jewish engineered. 

Goebbels used this occasion to desert Strasser and to swing over 
entirely to Hitler's side. From that day on Goebbels as well as 
Ley have consistently followed Hitler's directives and that day 
created the deadly enmity between Goebbels and the Strasser broth¬ 
ers which led ultimately to Gregor Strasser's assassination on 
June 30, 193^. The Arbeitsgemeinschaft of the northern Gaue was 
dissolved. 


1/ Konrad Heiden, Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Berlin, 
1933? P. 202, 203. 


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- 13 - 


d) The fight between the two wings, especially between the 
Strasser group and the Hitler majority, is well known. While 
Gregor Strasser finally accepted the leadership of Hitler, his 
brother Otto Strasser did not. He founded the "Fighting Commu¬ 
nity of Revolutionary National Socialists," later called Black 
Front, and submitted to the German public "Fourteen Theses of 
the German Revolution." 1/ These theses, though outwardly so¬ 
cialistic, do not contain any foreign political program except 
the demand for the unification of all Germans and the destruc¬ 
tion of the Versailles Treaty. Otto Strasser has, however, ex¬ 
posed his foreign political views in his book "Structure of Ger¬ 
man Socialism" to which his famous discussion with Hitler is 
. appended. 2/ 

The handing over of the trade unions to Ley*s Labor Front 
instead of to the NSBO; the elimination of Roehm; the decline 
of the SA, -- all these are steps in the eradication of the so- 
called ’socialist", that is National Bolshevik wing of the Nazi 
Party. 

The National Bolshevist doctrine had a deep fascination es¬ 
pecially for nationalistic intellectuals. The most articulate 
post-war nationalist, Moeller von den Bruck, espouses these ideas 
in his Das Drittee Reich , (3rd edition, Hamburg, 1931)* and in 
his lesser known but possibly more important book "Das Recht der 
Jungen Voelker" . 3/ The only novelist of repute that National 
Socialism has produced, Ernst Junger 4/ must be considered as the 
pathbreaker of National Bolshevism. 5/ 

The collapse of the Nazi system will again bring to the fore 
National Bolshevik trends that have heretofore been suppressed by 
the Nazi leaders. 

The problem which the Nationalist movement faced in 1918 and 
1919 will arise again. To the genuine Nationalist youth in Ger¬ 
many the solution of the problem after the defeat of National So¬ 
cialism will be very different from what it has been after 1918. 
The Nationalist groups may point to the enormous internal and 
external strength of Bolshevik Russia. They may attribute this 
strength to the fact that the bourgeoisie has been eliminated in 


1/ Published in Mommsen and Franz, Die deutschen Parteiprogramme , 
Vol. Ill, Leipzig, 1931* pp. 116-117. 

2/ Otto Strasser, Aufbau des Deutschen Sozialismus , 2nd edition, 
Prague, 1936, pp. bb-89. 

3/ 1919* especially p. 101. 

4/ Der Arbeiter, Herrschaft und Gestalt, 2nd edition, Hamburg, 
1932. 

5/ See also Franz Neumann, op . cit . pp. 139 to 199- 




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- 14 


Russia and that, while the Nazis talk about the people 1 s commu¬ 
nity, the Russians have established it by the extermination of 
their own industrialists, bankers. Junkers and middle classes. 
These groups, therefore, may attempt to ally themselves with 
the German working classes, hoping to swing them into National¬ 
istic directions. They will strive to bring about a reconcili¬ 
ation of Nationalism and Bolshevism and they will orient their 
policy towards an understanding with Russia, hoping that with 
Russia*s backing Germany can be restored to the position of a 
great power* 

To sum up:-' although the National Bolshevik leadership in 
the Communist as well as in the National Socialist Party has been 
exterminated, a situation may well arise in which National Bol¬ 
shevik ideas may again receive a powerful stimulus. Such a sit¬ 
uation will occur if, after the breakdown of the Nazi regime, 
conditions are imposed upon Germany which will destroy her unity 
and independence as a nation. In this case, the German national¬ 
ists may succeed in exploiting the sentiments and desires of the 
German masses for a National Bolshevik policy. It is reported 
that, in anticipation of such a situation, important Nazi groups, 
especially among the SS, are already infiltrating into the Com¬ 
munist centers of resistance. 


IV. THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS RUSSIA 


1. Apart from the National Bolshevik tradition predominant in 
the radical Communist movement and among the nationalistic or¬ 
ganizations, there is a very powerful pro-Russian trend which is 
quite independent of the internal structure of Russia. It is 
well known that for the conservatives the re-insurance treaty be¬ 
tween Germany and Russia concluded between Bismarck and Schouva- 
loff on June 18, 1887 1/ was the cornerstone of the conservative 
foreign policy and that the conservative opposition never for¬ 
gave William II not to have renewed the re-insurance treaty. 

At the end of the World War 1914-1913 three foreign politi¬ 
cal trends became apparent in Germany, the Eastern orientation, 
the Western orientation and the so-called Bridge theory. For the 
easterners, friendly relations with Russia- were to enable Germany 
to get rid of the Versailles Treaty and to establish herself as a 
great power. To the westerners, the entrance of Germany in the 
concert of Western Powers was.to provide the same result. The 
adherents of the third theory conceived Germany as a bridge be¬ 
tween eastern and western Europe and hoped by careful juggling 
between the East and the West, by playing off Russia against 
France and England to achieve concession after concession. 


1/ Text in Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria and Hunearv. 
Vol. I, p. 275. ■■- 


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- 15 - 


2. The western orientation stems from Prederich List. 1/ It 
found its most powerful expression in the writings of General 
Hoffmann. 2/ According to Hoffmann, the basic fact which the 
great powers in the world have to face is the crisis of industri¬ 
alism intensified by Russia's elimination from the world economy 
and Bolshevism's fight against the fundamental interests of capi¬ 
talistic society. The solution therefore is the destruction of 
Bolshevism and the re-integration of Russia into a world economy 
based on world economic collaboration and political integration 
of Germany, Great Britain, and Prance. 3/ Hoffmann desired to 
this end, the financial and economic cooperation of the United 
States. It is this thesis which went into Hitler's "Mein Kampf" 
and into Alfred Rosenberg's mythology. It amounted to the sug¬ 
gestion of establishing a huge world trust directed against So¬ 
viet Russia. 

3. This western school was, however, violently opposed by the 
army leadership, and by a number of industrialists and diplomats. 

The position of the German army towards foreign policy has 
been formulated with utmost clarity in General Von Seeckt's book, 
"Germany between East and Vest." 4/ Seeckt considers the west, 
especially Prance, to be Germany's natural enemy. He therefore 
advocates collaboration with Russia in spite of all differences 
in internal systems and ideologies. There are, he says, "no an¬ 
tagonisms between Germany and Russia based on geography, history, 
and race." Russian State Socialism is "a purely internal affair". 
He advocates that German business expands into Russia and that it 
becomes "indispensable and liked in Russia". Bolshevism, he adds, 
is a "purely Russian product". "Bolshevism in Russia will not 
break down if we dissolve the treaties of Rapallo and Berlin; but 
we shall then have an enemy on our border whose impact on our in¬ 
ternal situation will not be less.... Oup attitude towards Bolshe¬ 
vism has nothing to do with the possibility of economic and po¬ 
litical cooperation". He is afraid of Germany's isolation and he 
believes that Germany will have to face two enemies if her politi¬ 
cal relations with Russia are not friendly. "We address German 
politicians: Keep me the back free." 

There are many more of such proponents. 5/ It is well known 
that Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau passionately desired the alli¬ 
ance with Russia in order to fight the Treaty of .Versailles and 
resigned office when he did not succeed in convincing the Weimar 


1/ See on his doctrine Franz Neumann, cit .. pp. 105-106. 

2/ Nowak (ed.) Die Aufzeichmungen des Generals Max Hoffmann (1929). 
3/ Especially Vol. II, pp. 365-3&7* 

4/ Deutschland zwischen West und Qst , 1933, especially pp. 31-41. 

5/ See especially Wheeler-Bennett, Prom "Brest-Litovsk to Brest- 
Litovsk" in Foreign Affairs , 1939-1940, p. 196 . 




( 72852 ) 
















coalition* Social Democrats* Catholics and Democrats, Baron 
von Maltzahn, the head of the eastern department in the German 
Foreign Office* was a well known partisan of Seeckt and Brockdorff- 
Rantzau. Other German diplomats shared this view such as the well 
known Richard von Kuehlmann. 1/ 

The geo-politicians* whose influence on German foreign policy 
is* however* greatly over-estimated, were in favor of Russian- 
German collaboration* and Karl Haushofer has, during the German- 
Russian non-aggression pact* re-formulated the idea of the joint 
organization of the Russian-German space. 2/ 

4. It was the Social Democrats and the Liberals who sought to 
incorporate Germany into the concert of the Western Powers with¬ 
out alienating Soviet Russia. It is characteristic, however* 
that this policy could be carried out only during the time when 
the Weimar Republic appeared to be stabilized. Streseman 3/ re¬ 
pudiated "the thesis that German foreign policy must have either 
a western or an eastern orientation.” Erich Koch-Weser, the 
spokesman of the German Democratic Party* 4^ took Streseman*s po¬ 
sition and insisted that Germany’s task is 11 to be the bridge be¬ 
tween the east and the west”. He expressly repudiated the eastern 
orientation. ”lt is impossible for Germany to carry out a policy 
■of resistance against the west trusting in Russian assistance. 
Today Russia is not up to such a task. Should we be drawn* how¬ 
ever* into a war between Russia and the Western Powers* a Russian 
victory may bring us freedom against the West but the inundation 
and subjugation by Bolshevism". The third conception of Germany’s 
foreign policy* the bridge thesis* is today probably that doctrine 
which has the least support since liberalism in Germany* never 
powerful in history* has today b;ut little appeal. It is known 
that Streseman lacked support even by his own party and that his 
major support came from the Social Democratic party. * 

If the United Nations do not come out with a united policy 
Germany will again be compelled to choose between the east and 
the west. The eastern orientation has always been strong among 
the high officer corps .and among the conservatives, but even 
groups in heavy industry which considered England to be the main 
competitor were striving for friendly relations with Russia. 5/ 


1/ Thoughts on Germany , 1932* pp. 310 and 311. 

2/ Per Kontinentalblock (1941), pp. 15-16. 

3/ Vermaechtnis ,» Vol. II* pp. 93-94. 

5/ "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik in der Nachkriegszeit*” in Harms 

(ed.): Volk und Reich der Deutschen, vol. 3 (1929). dd. 182- 
183. ' 

5/ See the discussion in Franz Neumann* op. cit . * pp. 203-210. 


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- 17 




V. THE STRENGTH OF COMMUNISM AND OF OTHER ANTI-NAZI GROUPS 


1. The last free Reichstag elections in Germany were held on 
November 6, 1932. 

The result was: 


( NSDAP ‘ 196 deputies 

Right( Nationalists 52 

( German Peoples Party 11 

( Bavarian Peoples Party 20 

Center! Center Party 70 

( Democratic Party 2 

( Social Democrats 121 

Left( Communists 100 


The elections of March 5, 1933 were no longer free. Terror 
had already started. The whole Communist and Socialdemocratic 
press was banned, and many Communist deputies were either in SA 
barracks or in exile. Still the elections showed the following 
picture: 


( 

NSDAP 

288 

Right( 

Nationalists 

52 

\ 

German Peoples Party 

2 

( 

Bavarian Peoples Party 

18 

Center! 

Center Party 

74 

( 

Democratic Party 

5 

( 

Social Democrats 

120 

Left( 

Communists 

81 


2. The number of Communist voters in the last six months of the 
Weimar Republic was thus around six million. This figure is, how¬ 
ever, highly 'deceptive, since the Communist vote was subject to 
great fluctuations and corresponded in no way to the actual 
strength of the Party proper. Official Communist estimates of 
party membership 1/ were as follows: 


1/ Walter Rist, n Der Weg der KPD n in Neue Blaetter Fuer den 
Sozialismus , vol. Ill 1932, pp. 79-91* 


(72852) 








- 18 - 


1919 

- 

90,000 

1920 

- 

50,000 

1921 

- 

78,000 

380,000 

1922 

- 

1923 

- 

267,000 

1924 

- 

180,000 

1927 

- 

150,000 

1928 

- 

130,000 

1930 

- 

120,000 

1931 

- 

200,000 

1932 

- 

320,000 


(KAPD - 38,000) 


1 / 


The CP has thus never been able to organize a considerable 
part of the working classes. The influence of the CP, however, 
went far beyond the membership, especially when the late Kurt 
Muenzenberg was put in charge of CP propaganda and covered 
Germany with a network of transmission-belt organizations. 


3. The membership of the SPD vacillated around 1,000,000, 2/ 
but the SPD could count on the support of the Free (Socialdemo- 
cratic) Trade Unions. 3/ The Social Democratic Party, however, 
was in reality weak. It held no attraction for the youth. In 
1930, the age composition of the SPD was: 


25 years and under 

7.82 f 

26-30 years 

10.34 

31-40 " 

26.47 

41-50 " 

27.28 

51-60 " 

19.57 

60-70 " 

7.16 

over 70 " 

1.34 


4/ 


The CP, on the other hand, had a great attraction for the 
youth and Communist youth organizations (apart from the religious 
ones) were the only ones that allowed to the youth a broad enough 
field for activities. 

4. There are other considerable differences. The dissolution 
of the SPD and Of the trade unions came as an unexpected blow to 
the'leadership which had done nothing to prepare for underground 
activities.' The Executive Gommittee of the SPD had even refused 
to entertain such ideas as late as March 1933, while the Trade 
Union leadership tried to make peace with the new Nazi rulers. 5/ 


1/ This figure is questionable. Ir is quoted by Pjatnitzki, In ¬ 
ternationale Presse - Korrespondenz , 1932, No. 32. 

2/ 1,008,953 in 1931 see Jahrbuch der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie . 

1931, Berlin, 1932, p. 109. 

3/ 1931: 4,700,000 members. 

ty J ahrbuch der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie , 1930. 

5/ Neumann, ojd. cit ., pp. 4l3-4l4. 


(72852) 


















- 19 - 


The CP, on the other hand, at once started its underground ac¬ 
tivities for which it was trained many years ago and for which 
it had skilled Russian assistance. 

Under the Nazi regime, the fates of the Social Democracy and 
of the CP were utterly different. The Social Democratic member¬ 
ship displayed considerable resistance against the pressure of 
Nazism. No SPD and no union leader of repute has joined the 
Nazis, 1/ and the older ranks of the memberships were almost im¬ 
mune to the lure of Nazism. 

5. Some Communists, however, joined the Nazi movement, especial¬ 
ly members of the RFB, the Red Front Fighting League, which was 
shot through with gangsters. On the other hand, the underground 
CP organization was the most active underground movement. 

Ps/W interrogations indicate: 

a. that the CP underground still is the most important 
organization; 

b. that the Communist Youth Organization is still the 
most active youth underground; 

c. that, however, Gestapo agents have found entrance 
into the CP underground. 2/ 

While the CP thus is the best organized and strongest under¬ 
ground group in Germany, the appeal of Russian Communism has not 
increased and may even have decreased. 

5. The esteem for Communism among the German workers rose con¬ 
siderably during the Spanish Civil War -- a crucial period in 
Europe; it declined sharply during the German-Russian non¬ 
aggression pact, and climbed steeply with the decline of Germany*s 
military fortunes on her Eastern Front. 

These pro-Soviet sentiments are, however, counteracted by 
two basic factors: the low esteem in which the CP leadership is 
held 3/, and the fear of Russian domination over Germany. This 
fear is probably the most important single psychological factor 
inside of Germany. It has two causes: 

1. the feeling of guilt; and 

2. the fear of economic reparations. 


1/ There are but a few exceptions, mostly from the ADGB, the 

Federation of Socialist Unions, and then not leaders but em¬ 
ployees, and from the white collar unions, also employees. 

2/ See i.e. OSS document L 13297 and the study of the Central 

European Section of the OSS, July 20, 1943, Report on Prison¬ 
er of War Interrogations : Opposition to the Nazis . 

3/ See sources on preceding page and above. 

(72852) 









20 


Nazi terror in occupied territories aims not only at in¬ 
timidating the opposition but at making all Germans participate 
in the commission of terror acts so as to create a collective 
feeling of guilt and collective responsibility for crime. 1/ 

The Nazis have largely succeeded in this and Ps/W interrogation 
abounds in statements that the Germans fight supremely well in 
Russia because they are afraid of retribution for their crimes. 

They are also afraid of the post-war period. "Enjoy the 
War, Peace will be terrible" is a famous German slogan. This 
applies to the relations with Russia even more than to those 
with the Allies. The destruction wrought in occupied Russia 
must be paid some day by Germany. How can it be paid -- so 
they may argue —- except by German slave labor if Germany*s 
industrial equipment should be "badly damaged by air attacks? 

The Manifesto tries to allay these fears. 

6. The SP and trade union leaderships are probably the most 
discredited leaderships of any German democratic organization. 
The SPD and the trade unions wielded power -- the CP not. The 
SPD ruled Prussia until July 20, 1932; it continually boasted 
of its strength. 2/ It was the only great party fully committed 
to the defense of the Republic. The Weimar Republic may even 
be considered the creation of the SPD. And yet it failed com¬ 
pletely to adopt its policy to the new requirements. 

This does not mean that the democratic spirit is dead. The 
idea of a democratic socialism exists, and may now be stronger 
than it ever was. 3/ There certainly will have arisen a new 
leadership among the many localized groups in Germany not bur¬ 
dened by the failure of the old leadership. 

The SPD and trade' union influence in Germany must not be 
underestimated for another reason, though the SPD groups may be 
much less organized than the CP. The age composition of the SP 
may even prove to be advantageous today. Of 28,000,000 workers 
and salaried employees employed today approximately 11,200,000 
are foreign workers, which leaves approximately 17,000,000 Ger¬ 
mans. Of these, at least 11,000,000 are women, which leaves 
only 6,000,000 male Germans. Among these, the huge majority are 
4-0 years and over; that would cover the.age groups 31-50 years 
mentioned on p. 16, that is, those age groups which are most 
strongly imbued by the Social Democratic tradition. But numeri¬ 
cal strength is not identical with real strength. The Communist 


1/ See OSS Central European Section "The Nazi Defeat in Tunisia, 
the Coming Invasion of Europe and our PW." 

2/. See P. Neumann, ojd. cit ., p. 412/3. 

3/ See the above mentioned Ps/W interrogations. 


( 72852 ) 





21 


groups in Germany are certainly small, probably not exceeding 
30,000 -40,000. But their thorough indoctrination, their ’tight 
organization and the backing that they may obtain from Russia -- 
all this makes* them the potential leaders in the period of mili¬ 
tary and political collapse. Spontaneous uprisings are of great 
importance, but spontaniety evaporates if it is not channelled 
into an organization and a definite policy. Today, the Communist 
groups are potential leaders of the spontaneous opposition in 
Germany. This idea which has been insisted upon by the Central 
European Section time and again is confirmed by Ps/W interroga¬ 
tions • 


The fear of Soviet Russia will then be subordinated to the 
desire to remain an independent nation and to assure to the Ger¬ 
mans an adequate standard of living, political, social and eco¬ 
nomic security, , 

7• Maruy of the industrialists must realize that a victory of 
Great Fjritain and the United States may mean the end of Germany 1 s 
industrial expansion and may even lead to a considerable con¬ 
traction of economic activities. High officers may realize that 
with the economic isolation of Germany her military destruction 
is indissolubly bound up. Without an expanding economy modern 
armies cannot be maintained. The army may again become a small 
professional army without adequate combat weapons. Industrialists 
and. high officers, however, may be convinced that Russia may not 
desire a Communist Germany for reasons which cannot be discussed 
here but that an alliance with Russia may give to German industry 
considerable opportunities for expansion. The officers 1 corps 
may convince itself that Russia may desire a strong Germany 
against possible intervention by France, England and America. 

If England and America should support Poland’s claims for Ger¬ 
many’s Eastern provinces, these groups will still more be driven 
into the camp of Russia hoping to avert the dismemberment of Ger¬ 
many by placing themselves wholly at Russia’s disposal. 

It follows from the above that there is no pro-Russian sen¬ 
timent among the large masses of the people, that Communist sym¬ 
pathizers, Social Democrats and Catholics and liberals would 
prefer leadership by the Allied powers than submission to Russia, 
provided that this leadership does not destroy Germany’s national 
unity and independence. 

There is much less resistance to cooperation with Soviet 
Russia among groups of German industries and the high officers’ 
corps• 


In default of such leadership all groups with the possible 
exception of practicing Catholics and Junkers, will try to es¬ 
tablish cooperation with Soviet Russia basing their policy on the 
strong National Bolshevik trends within Communism and National 
Socialism and on the traditional pro-Russian orientation among 
powerful groups of the German ruling classes. 

(72852) 




/ 





